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MORALITY, IDENTITY AND "CONSTITUTIONAL
PATRIOTISM"
FRANK I. MICHELMAN*

I. CLAIMS

Among the aims that Habermasian political philosophy shares with
other, contemporary, liberal-minded political philosophy is the justification of politics. More specifically, the aim is the justification of democracy, which is, after all, a kind of political rule.
People wake up each day to find in place effectively compulsory
regulations of social life, "laws" with which the publicly supported
authorities in the land predictably will demand their compliance. None of
these people, as individuals, chose these laws for themselves. In a democratic country, the laws normally will have been decided by voting procedures in which majorities rule over dissenters. These might be simple
or "super" or compound majorities. They might be majorities of the citizens, or of some class or classes of them, or of some class or classes of
their representatives and officials. Whatever may be the precise history
of how a democratic country's laws came to be what they are, it will not
be that they were effectively made that way by the actions of any single
one, much less every single one, of the individuals who are called upon
to abide by them.'
From one standpoint, the question of political justification is that of
how and on what conditions it might be possible that individual members
of a modem society, each one sensitive to both political equality and
political differences, could all come willingly to comply with various
laws that none chose, and many would not have chosen, for themselves.
From another standpoint, the question is how it possibly can be right for
members of society at large to mobilize force (or the threat of it) as a
way to bring a population of presumptively free and equal individuals
into average compliance with laws that none of them individually chose
and many do not now approve. The challenge is to supply a moral warrant for the application of collective force in support of laws produced by
non-consensual means, against individual members of a population of
presumptively free and equal persons. For countries under democratic
rule, this means, as John Rawls has expressed it, to explain how "citizens
[may] by their vote properly exercise their coercive political power over
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am especially indebted to
conversations with Rainer Forst, Jirgen Habermas, David Rasmussen, and Charles Sabel.
1. See FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 14-16,31-33 (1999).
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one another"-to explain how your or my exercises of our shares of political power may be rendered "justifiable to others as free and equal." 2
In Part III, I show how the idea of the constitution plays a pivotal
and indispensable part in contemporary, liberal-minded political justification. I do mean the idea of the constitution as opposed to the thing itself. It must be the idea that is doing the work, I shall maintain, because
there can be no settled agreement among a modem country's people on a
description of the actual thing in all its concrete specificity. In support of
this claim, I call upon the recent political philosophy of Jtirgen Habermas. In his essay, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, Habermas shows the dependency of political justification on
something he calls "constitutional patriotism."3 I do not find that he
means by that expression either a devotion to any specific choice of constitutional content-for example, choice of a strictly "formal" as opposed
to a "material" or "compensatory" norm of equality (or vice-versa)--or a
devotion to any country in view of that country's specific constitutional
choices.
Neither, however, can Habermas be speaking only of people's attachment to some purely abstract, ideal notion of a constitution. To be
sure, constitutional patriotism does, for Habermas, have its aspect of
transcendental insight, of recognition of what a constitution unconditionally and counterfactually has to be in order to fulfill its pivotal role in the
moral justification of legal force. But what Habermas further shows is
that political justification depends, as well, on a population's conscious
sharing of sentiments of attachment to a concrete community (although
not, I shall insist, to any concrete constitution). Habermasian constitutional patriotism, in fact, is a confection of counterfactual constitutional
idea and empirical communitarian sentiment. It consists in a conscious
sharing of sentiments of attachment to the community, inspired by the
community's perceived attachment to the counterfactual idea. Habermasian constitutional patriots feel devotion to their country just because
they perceive their country's concrete ethical character to be such as to
make possible the credible pursuit in practice of a certain regulative political idea. I pick a small fight with Habermas by putting the matter exactly in terms of the community's concrete ethical character. Yet I do
believe he will agree that there is, in this instance, no prying apart die
morale from das ethische, no real-life disentangling of the call of unconditional rightness from the call of integrity or self-consistency, of loyalty
to the best one can make of one's own and one's community's life history and self-understanding.
2. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993).
3. JUrgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES INPOLITICAL THEORY 225-26, 20336 (Ciarin Cronin & Pablo DeGrieff, eds., Ciarin Cronin, trans., 1998) [hereinafter HABERMAS, THE
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER].
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IL CULTURES AND THE MAKING OF THE WORLD

A. The Linguistic Turn
Thus had I imagined the claims I would offer as a panelist, on the
occasion, as I supposed it would be, of delivery by Habermas of a paper
on legal theory, only to discover that what we would in fact be hearing
from Habermas on that occasion was his paper, Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn."
Bracing as that paper is, legal theory is not its concern. Yet it does shed a
helpful light on what Habermas does with the notion of constitutional
patriotism.
The Complementary Versions paper is concerned with the philosophical aftermath of an early-nineteenth-century "linguistic turn" in
metaphysics and epistemology, which Habermas traces to works of
Wilhelm von Humboldt. As Habermas sees matters, the linguistic turn
has required all of social theory ever since to cope with the idea that language "constitutes the world." According to this world-constructing view
of language, its "lexicon and syntax"
shape the totality of concepts and ways of apprehension by which
first a conceptual space is articulated for everything the members of
the community may come upon in the world.... [Ejach language ar-

ticulates a certain "view" of the world as a whole. Thus the formula
of language being the "formative organ of thought" may be understood in the transcendental sense of spontaneous world-constitution.
Through this linguistic pre-understanding of the world, a language
simultaneously structures the form of life of the community.... Language is no longer primarily seen as a [transparent medium for] representing objects or facts, but as the medium for shaping a people's
spirit.'

Thus language, by preordaining the grid of conceptual possibilities on
which facts can be spread, is said to assume a priority over the representation of the world, whether by oneself to oneself or by oneself to others;
just as it is said to take priority over intention by limiting what it is possible to think or say regarding the categories---objectives, purposes, motives, values, sensations, sentiments, beliefs, likes, dislikes, hopes, and
fears-by which one represents to oneself and to others the state of one's
own mind.
At no point does Habermas offer denial of this "transcendental"
position of language, meaning its decisive, irresistible, and limiting control over the construction of all possible objects and categories of experience and observation. But he does have a problem with it. Every natural
4. Jrgen Habermas, Hermeneutic and AnalyticPhilosophy: Two Complementary Versions of

the Linguistic Turn (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy, Denver, Colorado 1999) (on file with the Denver UniversityLaw Review).
5. Id.

1012

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

language is both a historically contingent matter and an indissolubly social one. If a people's language decisively shapes and limits both the
"spirit" of that people and the ways in which it is possible for that people
to perceive and to judge, then there are in the history of the world, and on
our planet today, an indefinite but certainly plural number of mutually
non-translatable, indissolubly collective spirits and ways of seeing and
judging, a plurality of "semantically closed universes" from which any
possible escape could only-since no one has conscious experience at all
outside of language and society-be tantamount to immediate entry into
another, comparably limiting "world view."
The linguistic turn thus calls into question the notions of moral experience and moral obligation, as Habermas and many others would understand those terms. It does so by seeming to preclude the possibility of
there being any trans-culturally or even trans-ethically accessible concepts, any concepts that remain the same, invariant, in the eyes of beholders from different "comprehensive views," as John Rawls might call
them, of the world and of the good. Any such preclusion must, it seems,
extend to motivational sorts of concepts, such as values, reasons, maxims, norms, and obligations. But if a value, reason, maxim, norm, or obligation cannot retain its identity under regard by persons speaking different languages, how can it be one that is unconditionally binding on
every individual human agent, just as human? If the answer is that it cannot, then an apparent result of the linguistic turn has been to preclude
there being anything to which Habermas would concede the title of a
moral value, reason, maxim, norm, or obligation.
B. The Retrieval of "Universalistic Tendencies": The Moral Experience
Localized
Or so it might seem. In fact, Habermas believes that the possibility
of the universal and unconditional bindingness of the class of maxims
and reasons for action we call moral can be salvaged from the linguistic
turn. He aims to retrieve "universalistic tendencies" from the linguistic
turn as rendered by Humboldt, and his Complementary Versions paper is
in considerable part the story of a salvage operation in which his own
philosophy has played a major part, although he gives others a generous
share of the credit.
Those universalist tendencies, Habermas explains in his Complementary Versions paper, lie in the "communicative" function that Humboldt was the first to attribute to language, along with its informative and
expressive functions. They lie in the perception that when parties to a
disagreement or misunderstanding enter into verbal exchange about it,
both parties-as Habermas puts the matter-"must, from their own point
of view, share the assumption of a point of convergence." That is, nei6.

Id.
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ther can make sense of what they are doing together, absent a working
assumption in the mind of each of there being a single object at hand, of
which the parties are giving competing accounts. That alone can explain
the parties' expenditures of effort to "learn to understand" each other's
reports (descriptions, analyses, assessments) of the object.
Thus does Habermas recover from the seeming devastation of the
linguistic turn the possibility of the experience of objectivity, and thus of
moral reasons and moral experience. But the recovery, as we now go on
to notice, is not a completely clean one.
Habermas finds in Humboldt the idea that a conviction of the standpoint-independent, identical reality of objects under discussion-a reality
that it's worth getting truly to know-is what keeps disagreeing observers committed to the work of coming to understand one another. But
notice a circularity of motivation here. The parties' sense of there being
some single object they are all perceiving, the truth about which they are
trying to resolve, is supposed to support their loyalty to their shared or
public enterprise of dialogue. But then what would have instilled in them
this sense of objectivity? We could say that the experience of the dialogic
engagement itself creates it. But then we would have to ask what in the
first place could have drawn the parties into the engagement, or made the
engagement seem possible to them. What possibly, except an antecedently existing expectation, among the parties to the conversation, of a
pressure felt by each to strive for a successful result? But then what in
their world and in their lives could prompt and sustain such an expectation? Only, it would seem (if we accept the linguistic turn), a language.
Anticipating an argument of Habermas to be reviewed in Part IV(B), it
would be a language in which the categories exist for recognition of the
freedom and equality of persons and of resulting reciprocal obligations of
persons to treat each other as such.
Must every human language necessarily be like that? If so--if there
are categories that a human language necessarily must have-what is
really left of the linguistic turn? But if not, then what Habermas has done
is something rather beyond a simple retrieval from the linguistic turn of
the possibility of moral experience and moral obligation. What he has
done is to show how human beings can, and some of us do, maintain in
our lives the category of the unconditionally obligatory (the moral), even
as we, accepting the linguistic turn, know that moral reasons and experience are reasons and experience into which we must always enter not in
entire forgetfulness but trailing clouds of consciousness from our particular linguistic home.7 In other words, what Habermas has done (at
least it seems so to me) is to make clear how there can be a wholly yalid

7. Wordsworthians may see in what I just wrote an implicit equation of language with God,
but isn't that, after all, one way of describing the linguistic turn? In the beginning was ....
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experience of the unconditionally obligatory that is not necessarily accessiblefrom within every humanform of life.
That observation will figure in my analysis of "constitutional patriotism" in Part V(B) of this essay. Before we can come to that, however,
we must pause for a closer look at some problems and solutions in liberal-minded political justification.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTARIANISM: THREE KEY COMPONENTS

Recall the aim of a liberal-minded justification of democratic politics: in Rawls's words, to explain how "citizens [may] by their vote
properly exercise their coercive political power over one another"-to
explain how your or my exercises of political power may be rendered
"justifiable to others as free and equal."'
Currently on offer from Habermas, Rawls, and others is what we
may call a constitutional contractarianmodel of political justification.9
The Rawlsian version is probably most familiar:
[Ojur exercise of political power is ... justifiable... when it is in ac-

cordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens may
be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable

to them as reasonable and rational. 0

This text helps us distinguish a chain of three key components in constitutional contractarian justification, as follows:
First key component: rational universalism ("all citizens [as rational] may be expected to endorse"). Constitutional contractarianism
begins with a proposition of very roughly the following form (specific
versions differing among philosophers): Exercises of coercive political
power can be justified, on the condition that every individual affected has
reason to accept them in the light of his or her interests. In the philosophy of Habermas, the more specific version of the rational-universalist
standard of justification takes on a decidedly intersubjecivist inflection. It
is that everyone, each judging from his or her own standpoint and with
due regard for his or her own interests, should be able to see how everyone else, each judging similarly, could find prevailing reason to accept
the political act or arrangement in question. "A law," proposes Habermas, "is valid in the moral sense when it could be accepted by everybody
from the perspective of each individual.""

8. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 217.
9. I should report that I feel a strong tug of attachment to the constitutional contractarian
model, although my aim in this essay is to cause it trouble.
10. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 217.
11. Jtlrgen Habermas, A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality, in
HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 31 [hereinafter Habermas, Cognitive
Content of Morality]; See also Jtirgen Habermas, "Reasonable" Versus "True," or the Morality of
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At the core of the rational-universalist type of justificational standard for political coercion that both Rawls and Habermas have in mind,
what we find is a demand for consonance between potentially coercive
political acts and the reasons of each (not "all," in some collectivized
sense of "all") of countless persons among whom rational conflicts of
interests abound. It is this uncompromisingly individualistic sensibilitythis apparent taking to extremes of insistence on the severalty and singularity of persons or their interests or their worths, this refusal in the last
analysis to let "the good of society" decide-that leads me to label "liberal-minded" the constitutional contractarian family as a whole.
Second key component: constitutionalessentialism ("in accordance
with a constitution, the essentials of which all ... may be expected to
endorse"). Now, no one seriously suggests application of such a universalistic standard of justification (consonance with the reasons of everyone) to each and every political act taken one by one, each and every
discrete lawmaking event or other exercise of political power in a country. In the modem free countries marked by what Rawls calls a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive views and ideas of the good and, correspondingly, by true conflicts among the politically relevant projects and
interests of sundry persons,' 2 it would be an obviously hopeless undertaking to apply such a standard to each and every discrete political act
issuing from a country's established lawmaking system.
Inevitably, what we find is that the rational-universalist standard of
political justification really is not meant for application on an act-by-act
or law-by-law basis. It is rather meant for application to the system of
lawmaking-that is, to constitutionallaws, the special set of basic laws,
including bills of rights, that fundamentally shape, organize, limit, and
direct the country's lawmaking operations. As a normative doctrine, constitutional contractarianism thus pivots crucially on the idea of the constitution. It absolutely depends on the idea that your acceptance as
right-as fair, as worthy of your respect---of a lawmaking system (or
constitution) commits you to acceptance of the daily run of lawmaking
events that issue from the system.'" That, after all, is the point of Rawls's
claim that exercises of political coercion are justifiable insofar as they
accord "with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens may be
expected to endorse.""

Worldviews, in HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 89-90 [hereinafter

Habermas, "Reasonable" Versus "True"].
12. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 36-37.
13. To be clear, the idea is that your acceptance of the system means that your finding particular laws unjust gives you no ground for resort to illegal force, not that it gives you no ground for
denunciation, bounded civil disobedience, or bounded conscientious refusal. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 363-91 (1971).
14. RAWLS, supranote 2, at 217 (emphasis added).
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But why does Rawls say "the essentials of which?" The deep and
interesting answer lies in a perceived need for objective certainty in the
application of basic systemic legal norms ("constitutional law") to specific controversies-a need apparently entailed in the pivotal role we've
just now assigned to constitutions in contractarian justificatory
argument.

5

Suppose there is firmly established in a certain country's political
and legal practice a publicly recognized set of basic laws, called "the
Constitution," that are seen to shape, organize, limit, and direct the
country's lawmaking operations. Everyone agrees that this Constitution
consists of twenty-six clauses, A-Z, the wording of which is canonical
and undisputed. But everyone also honestly believes that is impossible. to
say with confidence, of many enacted laws, whether they do or do not
truly comply with clauses T-Z, because those clauses just don't have objectively certain applications, one way or the other, to the kinds of laws
that are being enacted. (For example, clause T provides that everyone
must be guaranteed a "minimally decent standard of living" and the Parliament has just replaced welfare with workfare, reduced the minimum
wage by half, lifted rent control, and budgeted an annual sum of three
billion crowns for housing allowances and job training.) Those clauses,
then, cannot be regarded as a part of the essential constitution, the constitution that is supposed to be playing the pivotal role assigned to constitutions in contractarian political justification.
The general idea is that I can freely accept the daily run of coercive
acts from a constituted political regime, including those I judge to be
pernicious or unjust, because and only because (i) I regard this regime
qua regime as consonant with the rational interests of everyone including
me and (ii) I see the government and my fellow citizens abiding by this
regime. Such a conjunction of perceptions may be possible for me, but
only if at all times I can see confidently that (ii) is really satisfied. And I
can't if clause T is part of the regime in question. So even if T is a part of
the documentary "Constitution," it cannot be deemed a part of the essential constitution, the constitution that does the pivotal work that constitutions have to do in contractarian justification.

15. There is also a shallow answer, which is that any practically serviceable "constitution," in
the sense of a law that prevails over other laws and is not itself alterable except by following its own
(perhaps quite onerous) provisions for constitutional amendment, inevitably contains a certain
amount of arbitrary and even irrational matter that could not possibly be said to respond to reasons
attributable to everyone. It seems plain that the presence of some such matter in a given constitution
need not disqualify that constitution from playing its pivotal role in contractarian justification. For
example, the U.S. Constitution unalterably guarantees equal representation in the Senate to every
state regardless of population. See U.S. CONST. art. V. The idea is that a constitution may play the
pivotal role in contractarian justification as long as all of its "essential" parts can be seen to satisfy
rational universalism.

1999]

MORALITY, IDENTITY & "CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM"

1017

The sum of it is that constitutional contractarianism is a ticklish
business indeed. It requires the existence in a country-the being-inforce there---of an essential constitution that satisfies two potentially
contradictory demands. First, the essential constitution has to include
every systemic norm or guarantee that would be required in order for it
to give everyone reason for willing compliance with laws enacted under
the regime it constitutes. But, second, the essential constitution cannot
include any systemic norm or guarantee that, singly or in combination
with others, lacks the trait of more-or-less objectively certain application
to more-or-less all of the specific cases arguably falling under them.
Third key component. moral responsivism ("in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable"). Why and how can
sensible people allow themselves even to hope that there is any way at all
to satisfy both demands at once? It seems to me that all practitioners of
constitutional contractarian justification, Habermas included, pin our
hopes on a certain kind of favorable motivational attribution to persons
in general. Rawls imports as much by his stipulation that political acts
are justified when fairly found to accord with constitutional essentials
reflecting principles that should be rationally acceptable to every "reasonable" person.
If I am right, a full, rough statement of the constitutional contractarian model of political justification would go something like this:
Specific exercises of coercive political power are justified when
[CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALISM] they are validated by a set of constitutional essentials [RATIONAL UNIVERSALISM] that everyone can see that
everyone affected has reason to accept in the light of his or her inter-

ests,

[MORAL RESPONSIVISM]

considering himself or herself to be one

among a company of presumptively free and equal co-inhabitants, all
of whom are under moral motivational pressure to find agreement on
fair terms of cooperation within their necessarily shared social space.
By calling the attributed pressure a "moral" one, I mean it is conceived
as lacking any ulterior instrumental content, as being purely a motivation
to find and abide by fair or universally acceptable terms of social cooperation just for the sake of the respect that one thereby pays to oneself
and others as free and equal. I am hazarding the view that every contemporary philosopher who posits the possibility of the universal rational
acceptability of a political constitution does so on the stipulation of the
experience by all concerned of the moral motivation to find a fair agreement. 6 This may be a highly controversial suggestion. Habermasians

16. I am not saying that every contemporary philosophical defense of democratic-liberal
constitutionalism does in fact base itself on a showing of the possibility of universal acceptability. I
am only making a claim regarding those that do, a class in which I include the defenses recently
advanced by Rawls and Habermas. I am currently uncertain about whether to extend the claim to
defenses advanced by advocates of "ethical" or "perfectionist" (as opposed to "political") liberalism,
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may feel prompted to resist by the worry that it makes justification depend on an empirical contingency-the contingency, that is, of the persons concerned really having a specific motivation that no person, just as
a person, need have. That particular worry would be needless, however,
and explaining why will help set the stage for succeeding discussion of a
rather different sort of Habermasian worry.
IV. HABERMAS AND MORAL MOTIVATION

A. Hypothetical "Acceptability"
Making justification depend on everyone in fact being moved by
desires to find .a fair agreement (or perhaps by second-order desires to be
the kind of person who is thus moved) would apparently violate the unconditionality that Habermas appropriately requires of a justification of
politics. What, after all, is the point of justification? It is to establish the
possibility of a just political regime, and of everyone's moral warrant for
joining in the collective maintenance of the threat of force and punishment to secure compliance with the positive law of a political regime.
The nub of such a warrant must consist in reasons that everyone as free
and equal--everyone as capable like anyone else of arriving at his or her
own conception of the good-may be considered to have for accepting
the regime. So these have to be reasons that we can say apply to everyone regardless of particulars of situation, identity, and ethical view.
(Their nature seemingly must be that of what we call moral reasons.")
That doesn't rule desires as such out of consideration, because desires
surely can give people perfectly good reasons for action. Ruled out,
however, are all desires except for those (if there are any) that we can say
every person as free and equal must have. And maybe it doesn't seem
that anything like a desire to find and live by fair terms of social cooperation, or a desire to have such a desire, would be one that we can say
every person as free and equal must have.'8
Rather, it seems that in some countries at some times desires of that
sort might be common among the people, whereas in other countries or
at other times they would not be. In a Habermasian view (which is in this
respect a Kantian view), a set of constitutional essentials that is just and
morally supportable in a country where such desires prevail cannot be
unjust and morally insupportable in a county where they do not. The
question of justice cannot depend in that way on what desires a country's
people do and do not contingently happen to have.

such as Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in THE TANNER LEcruRES ON HUMAN
VALUES at xi (1990), and JOSEPH RA7,_THE MORALrTy OF FREEDOM (1986).
17. See, e.g., Habermas, Cognitive Content of Morality, supra note 11, at 21-22, 27-28, 32;
Habermas, "Reasonable" Versus "True," supra note 11, at 86-87.
18. See Habermas, Cognitive Content of Morality, supra note 11, at 15.
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What have we found out? That Habermasians cannot be constitutional contractarians, if or insofar as constitutional contractarianism
makes justice, or the possibility of justice, depend in that way on the
prevalence of "moral responsivism," or anything like it, among a country's people. However, it doesn't, not at all. The constitutional contractarian proposition is that a set of constitutional essentials is morally justified, and so is your or my complicity in the imposition of it and its legislative issue on the recalcitrant, so long as the set would be acceptable in
all reason to everyone who is imagined as a morally responsive person,
meaning (to repeat it) one who understands himself or herself to be one
among a company of presumptively free and equal co-inhabitants, all of
whom are under moral motivational pressure to find agreement on fair
terms of social cooperation.
The point is, the contractarian test of justification is one of hypothetical not actual acceptance of the constitutional essentials in question.
It is, as Habermas would have it, a test of "acceptability." 9 Contractarian
justification, therefore, does not depend on whether moral responsiveness
is in fact true of everyone or, for that matter, of anyone. (There don't
have to be any morally responsive people as long as some of the rest of
us can understand them well enough to judge whether or not a given set
of constitutional essentials would be acceptable to all of them if there
were any.)
B. A Short Genealogy of PoliticalMorals
As constitutional contractarians, Habermasians seek to establish the
possibility and general characteristics (at least) of a political regime that
is rationally acceptable-acceptable considering one's interests-to everyone who is (hypothetically) reasonable. They furthermore seek to do so
without supposing any substantive-ethical commonality among the people concerned. Can they succeed?
Consider the following genealogical exposition, as one might call it,
of the moral necessity of democratic constitutionalism. The exposition
starts with an empirical proposition about general human needs and desires, but one that no one is expected to question.' The founding proposition is that, in modern, plural societies, there is no alternative to the
ruin of everyone's life by social conflict and disorder but resort to the
always potentially coercive medium of positive, institutionally enacted
law. Thomas Hobbes, we suppose, has explained convincingly and for19. See id. at 95-96. Habermas maintains that only the actual conduct of properly structured,
democratic debate can provide an adequate basis for belief that the arrangements in question do
satisfy a test of (hypothetical) universal acceptability, but that is another matter. See id.; see also
JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF

LAW AND DEMOCRACY 296, 448 (William Rehg, trans., 1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS].

20. The scenario, writes Habermas, is "an ideal-typical development that could have taken
place under real conditions." Habermas, "Reasonable" Versus "True", supra note 11, at 39.
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evermore why, in posttraditional societies, everyone has reason to support some practice of positive legal ordering. Equally inescapable, however, is the certainty in such societies of profound, intractable disagreement over what the positive laws should be made to provide in substance
and over what should be the institutional arrangements for deciding from
time to time what the laws shall provide. From which it follows, Habermasians say, that the concerned persons have somehow to work out together their disagreements over these matters of basic positive legal
content and basic arrangements and procedures for further positive lawmaking.
Before going on to why they say that, and what they are driving at
when they do, it is well to notice how we have already established a nice
little beachhead in the campaign to justify a democratic constitution,
regarded as a particular set of arrangements for the production of positive
law, without the slightest hint of reliance on anyone's actually being
moved by any special substantive-ethical interests, motivations, or outlooks (such as "moral responsiveness" might easily be considered to be).
Habermasians say that no such reliance is needed, either, to finish up the
campaign. Logic, of a sort, is all that will be needed.
The logic runs as follows. As itself a positive law prescribing the
society's set of arrangements for the production of (other) positive laws,
the constitution sits in a delicate position. Inevitably, many of its provisions are themselves objects of reasonable disagreement, and yet these
provisions must at any given moment be fixed, decided, because in them
lies the institutional program for debating and deciding disputed specifications or proposed modifications of any and all positive legal prescriptions, including constitutional provisions themselves. How, then, can
contested constitutional provisions be justified? What can possibly provide a standard of rightness for the institutional program for deciding all
other politically decidable matters? Nothing other, Habermasians say,
than norms already implicit in a certain "point of view," the one that
"members of posttraditional societies . . .intuitively adopt when they
find they must appeal to reasons" to justify something.2' As Habermas
has recently summarized these norms, they are:
(i) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution [to the discussion] may be excluded; (ii) that all participants are granted an equal
opportunity to make contributions; (iii) that the participants must
mean what they say; and (iv) that communication must be freed from
external and internal coercion so that the "yes" or "no" stances that

21.

See Habermas, Cognitive Content of Morality, supra note 11, at 7; Ciaran Cronin & Pablo
HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at vii-

DeGreiff, Editors' Introductionto
ix.
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participants adopt on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely
by the rational force of the better reasons.
Habermas makes a strong case. There being in posttraditional societies no normative authority "higher" than "the good will and insight"
of those who must abide by basic terms of social cooperation, it may well
be said that the standard for deciding such terms and judging them, as
propositions of moral obligation, "must be derived exclusively from the
situation in which the participants seek to convince one another" regarding them.
But why must we judge these terms of cooperation as matters of
moral obligation? Why not as matters of legal obligation, which is how
we usually judge the validity of laws? When a warrant is demanded for a
law, a legal warrant is usually what we feel we are expected to produce.
But consider where we find this legal warrant. We find it, ultimately, in
the concrete constitution in force. (In the United States, for example, one
shows that.the law was enacted by constitutional majorities in both
houses of Congress and signed by the President, that it deals with a subject-matter assigned by the Constitution to the national government, that
it is not a bill of attainder and does not abridge the freedom of speech,
etc.) But the aim of the justification of politics is to provide a warrant for
complicity in coercive support of the constitution itself, and that warrant
cannot be a legal one. It can only be a moral warrant, and the Habermasian argument is that nothing can provide the constitution with such a
warrant except its conformity, in both a substantive and a procedural
sense-with regard, that is, both to its prescriptive programmatic content
and the processes by which it came to have that content-to certain
practical principles implicit in a certain "point of view." Namely, the
moral point of view, the "the point of view that members of posttraditional societies intuitively adopt" when they run into a need to convince
one another about some question of the rightness, goodness, or fitness of
something, because they see that the resolution of that something will
have to bind all of. them and they can't help regarding one another as
free and equal. (As the linguistic turn would have it, their language
won't let them.)
In other words, when Habermasians say that the justification of a
package of constitutional essentials is and can only be that it "could meet
with the acceptance of all those concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse,"' or that it could "win the agreement of all
concerned, on the condition that they jointly examine in a practical discourse" whether the package "is in the equal interest of all,"' they are
incorporating into that conditional "could" a hypothetical supposition of
22.
23.
24.
25.

Habermas, Cognitive Content of Morality. supra note 11, at 127.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
Id. at 36.
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moral responsiveness, or reasonableness, on the parts of "all concerned."
Their specific claim on behalf of democracy is that a constitutional practice cannot conceivably meet the standard of universal rational acceptability to the reasonable unless it makes its own content always open to
revision by processes meeting the same standard-unless it subjects all
further determinations of constitutional content to a certain, normative
conception of political democracy drawn from the ideal of a practical
discourse.'
You can now check through the whole argument, and you will see
that the abstract Habermasian moral justification of democratic constitutionalism has reached its completion without any empirical attribution to
anyone of moral responsiveness or any kind of motivational disposition.
V. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM
A. The Threatfrom Interpretation
Consider, now, that "constitutional patriotism" surely seems to
name some sort of motivational disposition. It names, I believe, a disposition of attachment to one's country, specifically in view of a certain
spirit sustained by the country's people and their leaders in debating and
deciding disagreements of essential constitutional import.
What can such an empirical notion be doing in Habermasian constitutional theory? The answer, I believe, lies in Habermas's sensitivity to
a claim I promised earlier to redeem: that it must be the idea of the constitution that does the crucial work in a constitutional contractarian justification of politics, because there can be no settled agreement among a
country's people on a description of the actual thing in all its concrete
specificity.
A country's disagreements of essential constitutional import can
never be restricted to disagreements about the wording of canonical constitutional provisions, the constitution's "clauses." There will also, inevitably, be disagreements about how the clauses are to be applied to
specific cases and disputes. Consider American constitutional experience. Again and again we have found that our constitution's canonical
provisions for constitutional essentials cannot be applied decisively to
26. In Habermas's text, the first of the quoted formulas in this paragraph is preceded by the
following:
... [Kant] tacitly assumes that in making moral judgments each individual can project
himself sufficiently into the situation of everyone else through his own imagination. But
when the participants can no longer rely on a transcendental preunderstanding grounded
in more or less homogeneous conditions of life and interests, the moral point of view can
only be realized under conditions of communication that ensure that everyone tests the
acceptability of a norm, implemented in a general practice, also from the perspective of
his own understanding of himself and of the world. In this way, the categorical imperative receives a discourse-theoretical interpretation ....
Id. at 33-34.
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real, live social controversies without undergoing momentous interpretations that will themselves inevitably be open to reasonable disagreement.
Think about substantive due process. Think about free exercise of religion. And think about equal protection: a principle of equal governmental
concern and respect for every individual is doubtless an American constitutional essential. Few will question that such a principle is canonically ensconced, and rightly so, in the American Constitution. Disagreement nevertheless breaks out over whether, in the United States today,
that principle prohibits, permits, or requires race-conscious government
action in any circumstances. Someone, let's say a majority of a doubtless
divided Supreme Court, is going to have to decide the question, and to
decide it over persisting, heartfelt-and who is to say not reasonable?disagreement. '
Remember, now, how it is that constitutional essentialism becomes
a key component in contractarian political justification. Realizing the
futility of a rational-universalist standard applied on an act-by-act or lawby-law basis, we hope instead that such a standard might be satisfiable if
applied only to a set of relatively removed, framing principles and ideals
for a lawmaking system. But now the difficulty, obnoxiously, seems to
reappear at the point where the relatively abstract framing principles
have to be applied to decide the legal validity of major, morally freighted
policy choices. (Let it be clearly understood that, throughout this discussion, my assumption is that the disagreements are over how to answer the
proper normative question; namely, under which of the competing interpretations will the set of constitutional essentials in question be one that
could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in a practical discourse.)
To state the problem another way: It is not clear how we can say that a
constitutional norm such as "equality of concern and respect" remains
invariant-remains one and the same norm-under reasonably contesting major interpretations of it ("color-blindness" versus "anti-caste").
And that threatens disaster to the proposed constitutional contractarian
justification of politics. For, obviously, the justification cannot succeed if
it turns out that the constitutional "principles and ideals" to which everyone, as reasonable, hypothetically agrees are just forms of words papering over unresolved and deeply divisive political-moral disagreements
among the reasonable.
B. ConstitutionalPatriotismto the Rescue
The point is one that Habermas has grasped and confronted. And his
way of perceiving and dealing with it, I now want to suggest, directly
echoes the explanation we earlier found in his "retrieval" of the possibil-

27. The point here is not simply that the requisite interpretative act will often be reasonably
contestable as conducted under any given method for constitutional interpretation. It is also that
among the country's people there are ongoing, reasonable disagreements about exactly what method
of constitutional interpretation is to be employed.
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ity of moral experience from the linguistic turn, of how there can be a
wholly valid experience of the unconditionally obligatory that is not necessarily accessible from within every human form of life.
Habermas, as I understand him, argues that citizens, moved by unshakeable recognition of each others' claims to consideration as free and
equal, may attribute overriding importance to upholding the idea of existent agreement on a single set of principles for their country's essential
constitution, and their sense of the urgency of affirming agreement on the
principles can keep citizens committed to the idea that their disagreements over the applications does not---cannot be allowed to-impeach
the invariance of the principles themselves. Major, disputed applications
of constitutional principles, Habermas avers, "cannot be ethically neutral." Nevertheless, he insists, "the debates are always about the best interpretation of the same constitutional rights and principles."'
They have to be conceived thus, Habermas appears to argue, because only on this perception of the persisting "sameness" of the constitutional essentials-their invariance under contesting major interpretations---can the constitutional essentials play their pivotal role in constitutional contractarian political justification. From that standpoint, a debate or disagreement over the interpretation of constitutional essentials is
a special kind of normative debate or disagreement, in which something
special is at stake, namely, the possibility of a form of political association that is just in the sense of rationally and reasonably acceptable to all.
The parties to such debates accordingly have, whether they know it or
not, a special reason for understanding the debates in a particular way.
From the standpoint of justification, there are always two alternative
ways to describe debates over constitutional interpretation -involving constitutional essentials. We can see them as debates over the meanings or
applications of a set canonical items, already securely certified as acceptable to everyone as reasonable, come what may in disputes over how to
apply them. .Or we can see them as debates over which of the contesting
meanings or applications will render these items acceptable to everyone
as reasonable. An obvious problem with the first view is its puzzling
implication that a nominal constitutional essential's rational acceptability
to the reasonable can somehow be independent of what that nominal
essential is going to turn out in practice to mean when push comes to
shove. And yet it is only by adopting the first view that anyone could
purport to judge that any given political regime is justified, without having to wait forever to see how every one of a never-ending succession of
interpretive disputes is going to be resolved by the supreme court or
other powers that be." It thus appears that the possibility of constitutional
28.
29.

(1995).

HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 225.
See Frank I. Michelman, Always Under Law?, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 227, 235-38
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contractarian justification depends on citizens being able credibly to see
debates over constitutional interpretation according to the first view, the
one that allows a constitutional-essential item to be judged rationally
acceptable to the reasonable before anyone knows how that item is going
to be construed and applied in hard, morally disputable cases.
So the question becomes: How can intelligent citizens possibly decide to approve, as rationally acceptable to the reasonable, an essential
constitutional item the content of which at the business end they do not
yet fully know?
The only possible answer to the question put in that form is that they
cannot. The fate of constitutional contractarian justification must hang on
a different possibility. There will have to be some way in which citizens
can perceive even their most intractable and divisive disagreements over
the applicationof constitutional norms to be directed to something other
than the content of the norms. But what else, then, might the applicational disagreements be about? What is there besides a norm's content
that can decide or help decide the norm's application? An apparent answer is: The context of application.
Now, one dimension of the context of application of an essential
constitutional norm is what some have called a country's "constitutional
identity."' Given disagreements over applications of essential constitutional norms, citizens don't have to ascribe them to ambiguity or vagrancy of meaning in the norms themselves. We might rather ascribe our
applicational disagreements to uncertainty or disagreement about exactly
who we think we are and aim to be as a politically constituted people,
where we think we have come from and where we think we are headed.
In a Habermasian view, it is indeed easier to see how citizens might differ over such "ethical" matters than how they could differ over the core
demands on constitutional practice exerted by the moral ideal of respect
for everyone as free and equal-an ideal, if Habermas is right, that is
transcendentally immanent in the practice of constitutional argument
itself. Those invariant core demands, then, always figure as a "fixed
point of reference for [a] constitutional patriotism that situates the system
of rights within the historical context of a legal community."
Thus, for example, in the United States today constitutional law
strongly protects freedom to utter racist hate speech3' while in Canada it
does not?2 In a Habermasian view, the difference is not evidence that
different basic principles of freedom and equality prevail in the two
30. For identitarian views of constitutional interpretation (as we may call them), see Bruce
Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519, 1519-36 (1997); George P.
Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 737, 737-46 (1993); ROBERT POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1997) (discussed in Frank I. Michelman, Must ConstitutionalDemocracy Be "Responsive"?, 107 ETHIcS 706, 706-23 (1997)).
31. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
32. See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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countries, but rather that the two countries have somewhat differing constitutional identities.33
We are close, now, to the core of "constitutional patriotism." "Constitutional patriotism," it appears, is the morally necessitated readiness of
a country's people to accept disagreement over the application of core
constitutional principles of respect for everyone as free and equal, without loss of confidence in the univocal content of the principles, because
and as long as they can understand the disagreement as strictly tied to
struggles over constitutional identity. And what explains that readiness,
when and where it is found? The answer to that must be that conditions
then and there warrant a level of confidence that the struggle over corporate identity occurs within a corporate identity that is already incompletely, but to a sufficient degree, known and fixed. The answer is, in
other words, a cultural contingency-the cultural contingency, when and
where it exists, that the corporate identity in question, however contested
it may be in other respects, is already perceived by all concerned to fall
within the class of morally conscientious (hence democraticproceduralist) constitutional identities. Listen to Habermas:
[I]n complex societies the citizenry as a whole can no longer be held
together by a substantive consensus on values but only by a consensus on the procedure for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate exercise of power. Citizens who are politically integrated in
this way share the rationally based conviction that unrestrained freedom of communication in the political public sphere, a democratic
process for settling conflicts, and the constitutional channeling of
power together provide a basis for checking illegitimate power and
ensuring that administrative power is used in the equal interest of all.
The universalism of legal principles manifests itself in a procedural

33. Several passages in the main judgment in the leading Canadian case suggest that such was
view of the Chief Justice of Canada:
The question that concerns us in this appeal is not, of course, what the law is or
should be in the United States. * * * Though I... by no means reject the whole of the
First Amendment doctrine, in a number of respects I am . . . dubious as to the
applicability of this doctrine in the context of a challenge to hate propaganda legislation
[in Canada]. * * * [A]pplying the Charter to the legislation challenged in this appeal
reveals important differences between Canadian and American constitutional
perspectives.... [I]n my view... the special role given equality and multiculturalism in
the Canadian Constitution necessitate a departure from the view, reasonably prevalent in
America at present, that the suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with the
guarantee of free expression. * * * Section 27 states that: "27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."
This Court has where possible taken account of s. 27 and its recognition that Canada
possesses a multicultural society in which the diversity and richness of various cultural
groups is a value to be protected and enhanced.... I am of the belief that s. 27 and the
commitment to a multicultural vision of our nation bear notice in emphasizing the acute
importance of the objective of eradicating hate propaganda from society....
Id. at 740-41,743-44, 757 (Dickson, C.J.).
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consensus, which must be embedded through a kind of constitutional
4
patriotism in the context of a historically specific political culture.
There, in that text, there is no ambiguity about what is and is not empirical and contingent. Political integration, a sharing of rationally based
conviction, historically specific political culture: all these expressions
refer to something that can only be empirical and contingent, namely, an
intersubjective cognitive convergence experienced by the people of a
particular country.
Habermas says it is not a "substantive" convergence on "values" but
a convergence only on procedure. Of course, discussion cannot end
there. We shall need to consider what these provisos mean, and how they
matter. Habermasian procedure, it appears, is very much a matter of what
we sometimes call substance. For example, Habermas observes, I believe
correctly, that "human rights" are a part of what it takes to "satisfy the
requirement that a civic practice of the public use of communicative
freedom be legally institutionalized."3 As for that discourse ideal that is
"implicit in the point of view" of morally responsive citizens who accept
the obligation to convince one another of the acceptability of the regime
to all concerned-is not that ideal a value? ' How about a "form of social
integration" consisting in "an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers?"37 Not a value? And are these not ethical values, at that,
concerned with and reflecting a particular way or form of life? A way of
life, I mean, that prefers honest reasoning with each other to force and
manipulation---or one that features a language (as I put it earlier) in
which the categories exist for recognition of the freedom and equality of
persons and of resulting reciprocal obligations of persons to treat each
other such.
I am not sure what is left, at this point, of the distinction between
substance and procedure. What does seem clear is that the fact of the
convergence of a country's people upon the discourse ideal-procedural

34. HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 225-26.
35. Compare Juirgen Habermas, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy, in HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 259-61 with Michelman,
supra note 1, at 16-18, 33-34.
36. Habermas differentiates "values" from "norms" along four dimensions. First, norms obligate, whereas values attract; the fulfillment of a norm consists in its non-violation, whereas the
fulfillment of a value consists in the successful pursuit of it by purposive action. Second, that which
is proposed as a norm either obligates (is valid as a norm) or it does not (is not valid as a norm),
whereas values fix relations or orderings of preference among various, perhaps alternative or competing, states or outcomes. Third, norms are unconditionally binding on everyone, whereas values
are relative to culture and belief. Fourth, norms within a system of norms cannot point in conflicting
directions, whereas values can be competitive. See Jorgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the
Public Use of Reason, in HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 55. It is not
clear to me that, by those criteria, the interpersonal-relational ideal implicit in the point of view of
whoever sets out to convince another is unambiguously a norm and not a value.
37. Jdrgen Habermas, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm, in
HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 3, at 159.
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and abstract as that ideal may be-is an empirical, contingent matter.
That point holds regardless of Habermas's persuasive suggestion that the
appearance of such a convergence among the people of a country need
not precede the establishment in that country of democratic-discursive
institutions, but rather can be expected to arise from those institutions.'
"The ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic
community," he writes, "must not be taken as a historical-cultural a priori that makes democratic will-formation possible." Such a national selfunderstanding is rather to be understood as "the fluid content of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalization of
citizens' communication."39 It is-the point seems to be-within the
power of the inhabitants of a country to create the convergence, "given"
' That "given"
their "political will" to do it.
seems to me to name an empirical contingency, and I do not see what is not ethical about it.

38.
39.
40.

Seeid at 159-6W
Id. at 161.
Id.

